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T his research identifies the factors that contribute to the buyer’s efficiency in utilizing supplier development practices for their supplier’sperformance. Prior studies support the notion that supplier development practices improve supplier performance; however, very few studies
focus on the factors that could improve a buyer’s supplier development efficiency. Using a survey sample of 261 manufacturing plants from 11
countries, this study shows that relational norms and information sharing affect supplier development efficiency. Furthermore, information shar-
ing by suppliers is more effective than information sharing by buyers in terms of efficiency enhancement.
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INTRODUCTION
Supplier development, a buyer-initiated effort, has been shown to
improve supplier performance effectively (Krause 1997; Hum-
phreys et al. 2004; Krause et al. 2007; Modi and Mabert 2007;
Li et al. 2012). However, the efficiency of supplier development
tends to vary. For example, a survey finds that the reported
reduction in order fulfillment cycle time due to supplier develop-
ment could vary from 30% to 80%.1 In addition, the reported
reduction in product defects varies even more significantly from
5% to 90%. This evidence, though anecdotal, suggests that some
buyers are more efficient at utilizing their supplier development
practices to develop their suppliers than others. That is, some
buyers are better at enhancing their supplier development effi-
ciency, which we define as the extent to which a buying firm
(i.e., buyer)2 utilizes its supplier development practices (the
input) to increase its supplier’s performance (the output). This
definition is consistent with the broader concept of efficiency,
which is generally defined as the extent to which inputs are
transformed into output (Green and Mayes 1991). Given that
buyers may differ in their efficiency of transforming their sup-
plier development into (improved) supplier performance, to iden-
tify interfirm differences in their supplier development efficiency,
we follow the same stochastic frontier approach adopted by
Lieberman and Dhawan (2005) in which they assess the impact
of resources on firm performance using the Battese and Coelli
(1995) model (cf. Lieberman and Dhawan 2005). While details
about this stochastic frontier approach are discussed later, mea-
suring efficiency with the stochastic frontier approach is superior
to the traditional output–input ratio approach. Stochastic frontier
explicitly considers firms’ heterogeneity across production factors
(Chen et al. 2015) and is capable of estimating both efficiency
frontier and a firm’s efficiency using cross-sectional data (Lieber-
man and Dhawan 2005).
We deliberately differentiate between efficiency (doing things
right) and effectiveness (doing the right things) in this study.
Given that existing studies have documented abundant evidence
pertaining to the effectiveness of supplier development practices
on improving supplier performance, the premise of this study is
that supplier development is effective; that is, supplier develop-
ment is a right thing to do. Yet, existing studies have remained
silent on how to do the things (i.e., supplier development) right,
and factors that could potentially enhance a buyer’s efficiency of
utilizing supplier development practices are unexplored—a gap
this study aims to fill. More specifically, the findings of this
study shed lights on “how well the resources expended are uti-
lized” (Fugate et al. 2010, 45) such that buying firms not only
do the right thing (by investing in supplier development pro-
grams) but also do things right.
Consistent with the literature, supplier development represents
a specific asset a buyer invested in their suppliers (Krause 1997)
that the ending of a given relationship will render little value of
such an asset. Supplier development, as such, exposes a buyer to
transaction costs (i.e., transaction risk and coordination costs)
from a transaction cost economics (TCE) perspective. To
enhance supplier development efficiency, buyers can reduce the
transaction risk and coordination costs associated with their sup-
plier development. This study investigates three such factors:
relational norms, supplier information sharing, and buyer infor-
mation sharing. There are two considerations that we focus on:
relational norms, defined as a relationship between exchange
partners based on mutual trust, concerns, and shared values
(Heide and John 1992). First and theoretically, relational norms
is built with the intent of reducing transaction costs stemming
from asset specificity, that is, supplier development (buyer’s rela-
tionship-specific investment) in this study. Second and extending
from the first consideration, whether the reduced transaction
costs associated with relational norms offsets the increased trans-
action costs associated with asset specificity is, nevertheless, an
empirical question (Artz and Brush 2000). To the best of our
knowledge, the dialectical opposition between relational norms
and asset specificity (i.e., supplier development in this study) has
not been explored. Thus, by examining the effect of relational
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norms in a supplier development context, findings of this study
can provide managers with guidance about prioritizing resources
and make theoretical contributions to better understand transac-
tion costs empirically, one of TCE’s key concepts.
With respect to information sharing, TCE has been docu-
mented as one of the most prevalent theoretical lenses (Kembro
and N€aslund 2014). Whereas buyer information sharing can
reduce transaction costs by reducing coordination costs associ-
ated with conflict resolution (Li et al. 2012) and/or misunder-
standing resulting from divergent viewpoints (Forker et al.
1999), supplier information sharing can reduce transaction costs
by reducing supply uncertainty (Li and Lin 2006) and by reduc-
ing a buyer’s coordination costs (Dyer 1997). In short, TCE
informs our choice of factors. In addition, our focus of these
three factors, particularly relational norms, furthers our under-
standing of TCE and its applicability in a supplier development
context.
Further, existing supplier development literature often exami-
nes information sharing as a single factor, specifically, informa-
tion shared by the buying firm (Humphreys et al. 2004; Krause
et al. 2007). This study extends the existing literature by consid-
ering information sharing from both the buyer’s and supplier’s
perspectives. In the existing literature, the role of a buyer is to
initiate supplier development and a supplier responds to such an
initiative (Krause et al. 2007). Specifying information sharing
into buyer versus supplier better captures the subtle yet crucial
differences between a strategic (proactive) act and a collaborative
(reactive) response. Second, differentiating between buyer and
supplier improves the understanding of information sharing both
conceptually and empirically. Conceptually, a closer look at the
existing supplier development literature indicates the concept of
information sharing is, in fact, buyer information sharing. For
example, “effective communication” is described as “open and
frequent communication between buying firm personnel and their
suppliers” (Humphreys et al. 2004, 134), or “buying firm respon-
dents were asked to specify the extent of their willingness to
share information with the supplier” (Krause et al. 2007, 536).
Empirically, differentiating information sharing into two separate
concepts can provide both the buyer and the supplier with more
specific guidance in a situation where the same act from two
sides may have different effects. In sum, differentiating informa-
tion sharing between buyer and supplier highlights another major
difference between this study and the existing supplier develop-
ment literature.
This study utilizes the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) (Bat-
tese and Coelli 1995). SFA allows researchers to relax the
assumption that firms are technically efficient (always produce
the maximum amount of output with a given set of inputs) in
estimating a production function, an assumption that is necessary
using ordinary least squares regression (Greene 2008). In other
words, SFA allows us to model the actual (in)efficiency, as
opposed to assuming firms are fully efficient in their use of
inputs—an assumption that is rarely warranted in reality. Since
we assume that a firm’s efficiency regarding producing output
(e.g., supplier performance) using supplier development practices
as inputs vary and influenced by other factors, SFA is more
appropriate than traditional regression approach. Further, SFA
allows us to infer an objective measure of supplier development
efficiency (deviation from the efficiency frontier) rather than
directly assessing efficiency in a subjective manner (Chen et al.
2015).
Figure 1 shows the theoretical model examined in this study.
Using a sample of 261 manufacturing plants from 11 countries,
this study finds that relational norms and supplier information
sharing each improves supplier development efficiency. Contrast-
ing to expectation, we find that buyer information sharing could
degrade supplier development efficiency. Robustness analyses
using an alternative two-stage approach and data envelopment
analysis (DEA), an alternative frontier methodology, are consis-
tent with the main results. Discussions and future directions con-
clude this study.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Practices related to supplier development
The term supplier development was first used as early as 1966
(i.e., Leenders 1966) to refer to manufacturers’ efforts to increase
viable suppliers and improve the subsequent supplier perfor-
mance. Such an effort was triggered by the “Buy Canadian” pol-
icy in the early 1960s, during a time when many Canadian
suppliers had poor quality. Poor supplier quality compounded
with the weak Canadian dollar (against the U.S. dollar) at that
time render “. . .the buyer’s responsibility. . .not to select, but to
create a satisfactory source” and as such, a “purchaser does not
select supplier development as an appropriate technique or tool;
it is the only course left, apart from in-plant manufacture” (Leen-
ders 1966, 54). Since then, supply chain management researchers
have discussed supplier development process (Hahn et al. 1990;
Hartley and Choi 1996; Krause et al. 1998), practices (Krause
et al. 1998; Reed and Walsh 2002; Wagner 2006), factors pre-
ceding buyer’s investment in supplier development programs
(Krause 1999), and results of supplier development programs
and from which identifying successful factors (Krause and Ell-
ram 1997a,b) and barriers (Lascelles and Dale 1989). Strategic-
oriented supplier development involves those practices in which
a buying firm takes an active role and dedicates physical and
human resources directly to a specific supplier with the goal of
increasing supplier performance to better meet the buying firm’s















Figure 1: Theoretical model.
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formal evaluation, supplier site visits, feedback, and supplier
training (Krause 1997; Krause et al. 2000).
Table 1 summarizes exemplary work on supplier development.
We highlight some observations from Table 1. First, previous
studies largely focus on the effectiveness of supplier develop-
ment by examining relationships between supplier development
practices and business performance (Wagner 2011), supplier per-
formance (Modi and Mabert 2007), and buyer performance
(Krause et al. 2000). Very few studies discuss how to enhance
the extent of efficiency with which a firm utilizes those practices
to achieve ideal supplier performance. Second, in terms of
methodology evolutions, early works are conceptual in nature
and much of them built on case studies; empirical studies
became more dominant as time progresses, and survey appears
to be the most commonly adopted approach for data collection.
Besides the content novelty (efficiency in this study vs. effective-
ness in the extant literature), our stochastic frontier approach
adds another novelty to the stream of supplier development liter-
ature. The third observation pertains to the studied contexts and
subsequent generalizability. As aforementioned, the term supplier
development was first coined by Leenders (1966) for studying
Canadian manufacturers. With this genesis, the first wave of
studies are North American dominant (particularly auto industry
related) with sporadic attention from Asia (e.g., Humphreys et al.
2004), and finally, there was a systematic interest from Europe,
notably by Wagner (2006, 2010, 2011) who collected data from
Germany, Switzerland, and Australia and published a series of
studies on this subject of matters. The data used in this study
encompass responses from 11 countries across three continents,
so the findings of this study can improve generalizability.
A transaction cost economics view of supplier development
This study uses TCE, one of the most commonly evoked theories
in the existing literature (e.g., Krause 1999; De Toni and Nassim-
beni 2000; Krause et al. 2000; Humphreys et al. 2004), as the
theoretical lens. TCE is appropriate for this study concerns a
strategic-oriented supplier development program (Krause et al.
1998). Two key assumptions characterize TCE: bounded rational-
ity and opportunism. Both are relevant to the context of supplier
development (Rindfleisch and Heide 1997). Bounded rationality
refers to both the neurophysiological and language limits of indi-
viduals (Simon 1955). Decision makers, while attempting to act
rationally under conditions of uncertainty, are constrained by
bounded rationality. As such, bounded rationality gives rise to
transaction costs, defined as the sum of coordination costs and
transaction risk, that need to be minimized (Williamson 1991).
Opportunism refers to behaviors in which individuals act in their
own self-interest (Williamson 1985). Similar to bounded rational-
ity, the existence of opportunism gives rise to transaction costs
(Williamson 1981, 1985). Since a supplier development program
is often tailored for a given supplier, from a buyer’s perspective,
supplier development practices are often relationship specific (i.e.,
high asset specificity that has low transferability to other relation-
ships). Therefore, supplier development practices can be seen as
relationship-specific assets with high asset specificity (Krause
1997; Modi and Mabert 2007). These relationship-specific assets
inevitably expose buyers to transaction risk and coordination
costs. For instance, the supplier might take advantage of the
buyer’s sunken investment that increases transaction risk (e.g.,
supplier opportunism, supply uncertainty) (Grover and Malhotra
2003). Developing a supplier also necessitates high coordination
costs to the buyer, ranging from the ex ante supplier selection
(search cost) and contracting efforts (contracting cost) to the ex
post efforts in verifying supplier compliance and evaluating per-
formance (monitoring cost and enforcement cost if sanctions are
levied) (Grover and Malhotra 2003). In summary, the TCE per-
spective prescribes that the buyers would incur coordination costs
and transaction risk with the implementation of supplier develop-
ment practices due to opportunism and bounded rationality.
Therefore, a buyer can increase its supplier development effi-
ciency by reducing the transaction costs accompanying by sup-
plier development practices.
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Per TCE, the high asset specificity nature of supplier develop-
ment practices entails coordination costs and transaction risk to a
buyer, which affect the utilization of resources. Building rela-
tional norms could help curb supplier opportunism and lower
transaction costs (Frazier et al. 1988; Heide and John 1988), and
hence increase supplier development efficiency. When high rela-
tional norms exists, a buyer could spend less time and resources
on monitoring efforts, thus reducing buyer’s coordination costs
(Dyer and Chu 2003; Nyaga et al. 2010). In addition, high rela-
tional norms serves as a better safeguard if a given relationship
continues, reducing the transaction risk. In a sense, a high
degree of relational norms allows buyers to focus more on real-
izing the full benefits of the supplier development practices with-
out worrying about suppliers taking advantage of the buyer’s
investment. This is in line with the extant supplier development
literature that the buying firms’ perspective toward suppliers has
been identified as one of the antecedents to supplier development
programs (Krause 1999) and that transaction-specific supplier
development is influenced by trust and long-term commitment
(Li et al. 2012). In contrast, buyers in a relationship character-
ized by a low degree of relational norms may not realize the full
potential of supplier development practices because their concern
of supplier opportunism would entail more ex post efforts and
incur higher monitoring and enforcement costs, negatively
impacting supplier development efficiency. Further, suppliers in
a relationship characterized by a high degree of relational norms
may be more willing to provide their expertise and work with
buyers on realizing the benefits of supplier development prac-
tices. Conversely, with a low level of relational norms, suppliers
may refrain themselves from participating in buyers-initiated
supplier development activities, suspecting buyers may consis-
tently act in their own interest (Nagati and Rebolledo 2013).
Therefore, a relationship with high relational norms helps buyers
better realize benefits from supplier development practices and
helps suppliers to fully participate in those practices and ulti-
mately improve their supplier performance. In sum, we posit that
high relational norms reduces transaction costs associated with
supplier development practices and improves a buyer’s supplier
development efficiency.
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Table 1: Supplier development: an exemplary review of literature
Reference Nature of the study Main content
Leenders (1966) Conceptual -first use of the term “supplier development” (SD) as part of the supplier
selection process, particularly (but not limited to) selecting new source
-use SD to refer to (Canadian) manufacturers’ efforts to increase viable
supply source and improve subsequent supplier performance
-defines a broader view of SD as “situation in which the purchaser can see
unusual benefits for the potential supplier (of which the supplier is
unaware) if he can be persuaded to undertake the contract” (p. 54)
Hahn et al. (1990) Conceptual -discuss both a “narrow” perspective of SD that aims to develop a supplier
that has not delivered products to a focal firm before, and a “broad”
perspective that pertains to developing an extant supplier
-present a two-dimensional matrix and categorize SD activities. One
dimension is related areas (product, process, and operating systems related),
and the other dimension is capabilities (technical, quality, delivery, and
cost)
-present a conceptual model that outlines the organizational decision process
of a supplier development program
Watts and Hahn (1993) Empirical (survey) -survey to determine the level of involvement in SD and the results
indicated that large firms are more likely to be involved
-assess the success of the SD programs and the results confirmed the
importance of formal supplier evaluation in the SD process
-assess the effectiveness of SD by rating a series of questions using 7-point






-describe supplier development process
-identify four factors that instrumental to sustain and spread improvement
activities throughout a supplier organization: (1) hands-on training of
supplier team members, (2) regular follow-up and measurement by the
customer, (3) fit between the improvement approach and supplier firm’s
culture, (4) support in the supplier’s organization
Krause and Ellram
(1997b)
Empirical (survey) -survey firms’ experience about their supplier development programs and
different firms into “fallen short” and “exceeded” groups
-show that the two groups are significantly different in formal evaluation,
providing feedback of evaluation results, use of a supplier certification
program, site visits to the suppliers, visits to the buying firm by supplier’s
representatives, supplier recognition, training and education of the




Empirical (survey) -majority of buyers involved in SD will perceive their suppliers as partners
-buyers involved in SD emphasize on sharing information with suppliers,
top management involving in buyer–supplier relationship, cross-functional
teams, and purchase a larger percentage of the supplier’s annual sales
Krause et al. (1998) 1. Empirical: part of a larger
empirical research effort, that
is, the Global Procurement




-differentiate between reactive versus strategic SD: The former aims to
improve poor supplier performance and eliminate deficiencies, whereas the
latter aims for continuous improvement of supply base with a focus on
long-term competitive advantages
-describe a generic 10-step process model of SD
-differentiate between supplier assessment on performance and assessment
system of capabilities
-present three propositions regarding circumstances/conditions that under
which firms are more likely to participate in strategic SD programs
Continued.
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Table 1: (Continued)
Reference Nature of the study Main content
Krause (1999) 1. Empirical: survey
2. Structural
equation modeling (SEM)
-apply transaction cost theory and classify antecedents into three groups: the
environmental and influence factors (market competition, rate of tech
change, top management support, importance of inputs to the buying firm);
the attitudinal factor (buyer’s attitude toward suppliers); and the barrier
factors (supplier commitment, interfirm communication, buyer’s expectation
of relationship continuity)
-the proposed model is mostly supported except that rate of tech change
does not influence buyer’s perspective toward suppliers and that buyer’s
expected relationship continuity does not influence SD activities
Krause et al. (2000) 1. Empirical (survey from 279
manufacturing firms)
2. SEM
-apply transaction cost theory, resource-based theory, and internalization
theory to categorize SD strategies as internalized (conceptualized using the
transaction cost theory) versus externalized (conceptualized using the
resource-based theory) activities
-examine the impact of SD activities on supplier performance and show that
while direct involvement activities (i.e., internalized SD strategy) play a
critical role in performance improvement, external activities (supplier








-document and show which dimension of SD is important for successful
just-in-time implementation; among the three, the “design link” is most
closely connected to SD
-specifically, all three links (“quality link,” “logistics link,” and “design
link”) are connected to the “supplier assistance and training” SD practice,
and both “logistics and design links” are connected to the “organizational
integration” SD practice, and only the “design link” is connected to the
“contractual incentives” SD practice
Reed and Walsh
(2002)
Case study (12 interviews) -describe and differentiate SD as a practice that is either reactive (to deal
with poor supplier performance) or strategic (to enhance the supply base’s
long-term capability). This differentiation is in line with Krause et al.
(1998)
-propose that buyers prioritize supplier capabilities on quality, cost, and





-transaction-specific SD predicts buyer–supplier performance improvement
-infrastructure factors such as trust, supplier strategic objectives, and
effective communication play an important role of buyer–supplier
performance
-direct SD is correlated to infrastructure factors of SD, indicating SD is not
an isolated behavior of the buying firms
Wagner (2006) 1. Empirical (case studies and
survey)
2. Exploratory factor analysis
-combine qualitative (case studies) with quantitative (survey across firms in
three German-speaking countries: Germany, Switzerland, and Austria)
approach
-differentiate SD into direct (internalized) and indirect (externalized): The
buying firm plays an active role and dedicates human and/or capital
resources to a specific supplier in the former, whereas the buying firm
commits little or no resources to a specific supplier in the latter
-direct SD activities involve human and capital investment, whereas indirect
SD activities involve both ad hoc (occasional) and regular supplier
evaluations, evaluation system and process, communication
Continued.
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H1: Relational norms is positively associated with supplier
development efficiency.
Information sharing between a buyer and a supplier is another
key approach to encouraging conflict resolution (Spekman 1988;
Li et al. 2012) and has been identified as a critical element in
successful supplier development (Krause and Ellram 1997b).
Buyer information sharing is the extent to which a buyer openly
shares information with a supplier (Paulraj et al. 2008). Buyers
who share information with suppliers could help their suppliers
better realize the benefits of supplier development practices,
improving the supplier development efficiency. To start with,
open communication pertaining to the scope and goal of supplier
development helps reduce contracting efforts, thereby reducing
coordination costs. For example, buyers who share product qual-
ity information may help their suppliers better utilize the quality
control training offered by the buyer. Similarly, buyers who
share demand information may help the supplier better utilize the
forecasting training provided by the buyers. Also, divergent
viewpoints may lead to different understandings about supplier
development (Forker et al. 1999), which increases transaction
risk. Buyers who share information with suppliers could reduce
the likelihood of misunderstanding, assuring the suppliers that
buyers are interested in the success of the supplier development.
Thus, we propose the following:
H2: Buyer information sharing with suppliers is positively
associated with supplier development efficiency.
Interfirm communication is a two-way street. Supplier infor-
mation sharing, a mirrored concept of buyer information sharing,
is the extent to which a supplier openly shares information with
a buying firm from which the supplier receives assistance. From
the TCE perspective, supplier information sharing could increase
supplier development efficiency by reducing transaction risk and
the associated coordination costs. A supplier sharing information
with its buyers could reduce supply uncertainty (Li and Lin
2006; Yu et al. 2013). Supply uncertainty can preclude a buyer’s
ability to verify and ensure supplier compliance and gives rise to
transaction risk and increases coordination costs. Suppliers shar-
ing information such as updates on delivery schedules, produc-
tion cost, and product quality reduce supply uncertainties for
buyers (Lin et al. 2002; Grover and Malhotra 2003). Supplier
sharing those pieces of information may also indicate supplier
commitment, which has been found as one of the critical antece-
dents to the success of supplier development programs (Krause
1999). Supplier information sharing could also reduce a buyer’s
coordination costs (Dyer 1997). For example, suppliers sharing
production and delivery schedule information could reduce a
buyer’s costs in coordinating internal activities. Past study also
shows that sharing product quality information could reduce a
buyer’s costs related to ensuring supplier compliance (Dyer
1997). Thus, we propose the following:
H3: Supplier information sharing with buyers is positively
associated with supplier development efficiency.
Last, we theorize that relational norms and information sharing
by buyer and by supplier could jointly influence supplier devel-
opment efficiency by reducing transaction costs. For buyers, sup-
plier development practices subject a buyer to supplier
opportunism, increasing transaction costs for buyers. A high
Table 1: (Continued)
Reference Nature of the study Main content
Wagner (2010) 1. Empirical paper (survey
sent to industrial and service
firms in three European
countries)
2. Regression analysis
-differentiate SD activities into direct versus indirect and investigate their
respective relationships to supplier performance
-discuss various theoretical lens applied in the existing studies, including
theories relevant to the links between indirect SD activities and
performance (goal-setting theory, the concept of “influence strategy”) and
those relevant to the links between direct SD activities and performance
(TCE and knowledge-based view of the firm)
-found that (1) indirect SD improves suppliers’ performance and capabilities,
(2) direct SD improves suppliers’ capabilities only, and (3) firms should
engage in either indirect or direct SD but not in both simultaneously




-draw on social capital theory to show that the length of the buyer–supplier
relationship can better explain the links between direct SD activities and
performance: Relationship length is used as a proxy for the life cycle of a
given relationship





2. Partial least square
(variance-based SEM)
-survey manufacturing sectors in Canada
-adopt a supplier viewpoint and show that supplier’s trust, preferred
customer status, and environmental dynamism all impact SD activities and
the subsequent supplier performance
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level of relational norms reduces transaction costs and encour-
ages frequent and open information sharing with their suppliers
(Heide and John 1992), which further reduces transaction risk
and coordination costs.
Similarly, from a supplier’s viewpoint, on the one hand, sup-
pliers sharing confidential information expose them to buyers’
opportunism; on the other hand, suppliers’ willingness to share
information signals their trust in buyers and characterizes a high
level of relational norms, which further curbs opportunism and
reduces transaction costs (Nagati and Rebolledo 2013).
Specific to the context, we posit that information sharing and
relational norms together promote a better environment for joint
problem solving (Watts and Hahn 1993; McEvily and Marcus
2005; Modi and Mabert 2007), which increases supplier develop-
ment efficiency. Relational norms promotes involving not just
purchasing personnel but also engineers in the supplier develop-
ment process (Reed and Walsh 2002). Further, relational norms
encourages behaviors toward collective goals and mutual bene-
fits. Information sharing increases both buyer and supplier’s
awareness of potential supplier development problems and
opportunities. Joint problem solving becomes more efficient with
the exchange of sensitive and/or proprietary information and with
the exchanged partners both willing to listen and accept sugges-
tions. Taken together, relational norms and information sharing
jointly create an environment that facilitates joint problem solv-
ing, which helps increase supplier development efficiency.
H4a: There exists a synergistic effect between relational
norms and buyer information sharing on supplier develop-
ment efficiency.
H4b: There exists a synergistic effect between relational
norms and supplier information sharing on supplier devel-
opment efficiency.
DATA AND SAMPLE
This study uses part of the data collected by the fourth round
of the High-Performance Manufacturing (HPM) research pro-
ject (Schroeder and Flynn 2001). HPM is a large-scale global
research project that involves a team of international research-
ers. HPM examines manufacturing practices at the plant level
in three specific industries: electronics, machinery, and trans-
portation. Many studies have been published based on previous
rounds of HPM project. The fourth-round HPM data involve
manufacturing plants in 11 countries (China, South Korea,
Japan, Taiwan, Brazil, Germany, Sweden, Finland, Israel, Italy,
and Spain). Participation in HPM requires extensive efforts on
the part of the plant. To increase a firm’s willingness to par-
ticipate, research team members spent a significant amount of
time with prospective firms to explain the benefits of participa-
tion in the study. Researchers rely on their own personal or
on university networks to contact prospective firms. Once a
firm agrees to participate, the firm manager identifies a high-
performing plant with at least 100 employees for the survey.
To reduce the potential impact of unobserved firm-level varia-
tions, each participating firm is limited to one plant. The plant
coordinator receives a package that consists of 12 survey ques-
tionnaires, which cover different manufacturing and
environmental aspects (e.g., supply chain, operations, human
resources, competitive environment) for distribution to the
appropriate respondents. To increase the accuracy of informa-
tion, the survey requires the respondents’ expertise or job titles
to be directly related to the survey questions. In this study,
two upstream supply chain managers (e.g., purchasing man-
ager) respond to the survey questions. Measurement items are
mixed in the questionnaires to reduce the context effects
(Tourangeau et al. 2003). Using multiple respondents and
mixed survey items help reduce the common method bias
(Podsakoff et al. 2003). The final data set consists of 261
plants. Consistent with the previous round of HPM project
(e.g., Zhang et al. 2012), the response rate varies across coun-
tries and is approximately 60 percent as indicated in a recent
study (Turkulainen et al. 2017). Table 2 provides the sample
distribution across countries and industries.
METHODOLOGY
SFA estimates an individual unit’s inefficiency as the distance to
the efficient frontier (Battese and Coelli 1995; Lieberman and
Dhawan 2005; Chen et al. 2015). Specifically, SFA constructs an
efficient frontier, which is the ideal output level achieved given a
specific set of inputs among a group of units (see Figure 2). The
inefficiency term infers a unit’s efficiency of transforming “the
inputs available to it . . . and converts them into whatever output
it desires. . .” (Dutta et al. 2005, 278). Therefore, the closer a unit
to the frontier, the better the unit’s relative efficient use of
resources. In this study, we operationalize supplier development
(in)efficiency using the inefficiency term described in the follow-
ing paragraph (Table 3).
Stochastic frontier analysis
SFA decomposes the observed output into three elements: the
ideal output (i.e., the desired outcome) determined by a set of
inputs (i.e., resources), the random error term, and the
Table 2: Sample distribution across industry and country
Country Electronics Machinery Transportation Total
Brazil 5 6 9 20
China 10 10 10 30
Finland 6 6 5 17
Germany 6 13 9 28
Israel 21 5 0 26
Italy 7 17 5 29
Japan 6 7 8 21
Spain 6 8 11 25
Sweden 4 4 1 9
South
Korea
8 5 13 26
Taiwan 19 9 2 30
Total 98 90 73 261
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inefficiency term (Aigner et al. 1977; Meeusen and van Den
Broeck 1977). The stochastic frontier model has the following
formation:
Yi ¼ f ðXi; bÞ þ vi  ui ð1Þ
where Yi is the actual output; f ðXi; bÞ is the production func-
tion, which denotes ideal output as a function of a set of inputs
Xi with unknown coefficients b. The production function in
Equation (1) represents the idealized efficient frontier—the maxi-
mum expected output given inputs X, common to all sample
organizations. Variable vi captures the random errors affecting
outputs due to unobserved inputs or measurement errors in data.
Finally, ui depicts the relative distance to the efficient frontier,
that is, the inefficiency of an individual unit i regarding trans-
forming inputs to an output.
Figure 2 illustrates the notion of the efficient frontier with one
input and one output, where the value of the input X is shown
on the horizontal axis and output Y is shown on the vertical axis.
The deterministic efficient frontier reflects the existence of dimin-
ishing returns to scale. As illustrated, firm A uses input XA to
produce the observed output YA. If firm A is fully efficient in uti-
lizing resources (i.e., there is zero inefficiency: u ¼ 0), then firm
A should achieve the ideal output YA ¼ f ðxÞ þ v. When the ran-
dom noise (v) is positive, the ideal output lies above the deter-
ministic efficient frontier.
The main contrast of SFA and traditional least square regres-
sion approach is that the traditional approach attributes the devia-
tion from the efficient frontier to random error vi only, while
SFA recognizes firm-specific inefficiency ui as a potential cause
of the deviation. SFA also allows exogenous variables to affect
the extent of inefficiency ui. The three most common assump-
tions of the inefficiency term in SFA are exponential, half-nor-
mal, and truncated normal (Aigner et al. 1977; Stevenson 1980).
The choice of distribution assumption is typically computational
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Figure 2: Illustration of the efficient frontier.
Table 3: Summary statistics and correlations
Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Supplier performance 3.663 0.513 1
2. Plant size 844.117 1994.74 0.084 1
3. Supplier development initiative 3.786 0.595 0.575** 0.156* 1
4. Supplier evaluation 3.859 0.905 0.438** 0.161* 0.591* 1
5. Relational norms 3.867 0.540 0.563** 0.037 0.645** 0.453** 1
6. Buyer information sharing 3.194 0.953 0.330** 0.038 0.284** 0.264** 0.143* 1
7. Supplier information sharing 3.143 0.899 0.483** 0.009 0.355** 0.382** 0.241** 0.663**
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < .001.
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truncated normal assumption is not able to converge on our data,
we opt for a more parsimonious half-normal model. We consider
the half-normal assumption by Caudill and Ford (1993), Caudill
et al. (1995), and Hadri (1999), which allows heteroskedasticity
in the distribution of ui to analyze the effects of exogenous fac-
tors on inefficiency ui. Equations (2) and (3) specify the half-
normal inefficiency model.
u jNð0; r2uÞj ð2Þ
r2ui ¼ expðd0ZiÞ ð3Þ
In Equation (3), a positive value of the d coefficient indicates
that as the level of exogenous variable Z increases, so does the
variance of technical inefficiency (ru). A negative d indicates
that the exogenous variable reduces the variance of technical
inefficiency. Last, we adopt a one-step approach and estimate the
production function and the inefficiency model simultaneously
following recommendations by Chen et al. (2015).
Measurements
Inputs and output of the production function
Prior studies have used managerial practices as inputs because
they represent resources utilized in generating outcomes (e.g.,
Narasimhan et al. 2001). This study views supplier development
practices as the inputs X and supplier performance as the output
Y of the production function in Equation (1) because the focus is
on the buyer’s supplier development efficiency. Several supplier
development-related practices have been discussed in the litera-
ture. The construct of supplier development initiative captures
the practices that require a buying firm’s active involvement,
such as providing technical assistance, training, and joint meet-
ings (Krause 1997; Swink et al. 2005; Narasimhan et al. 2009).
The construct of supplier evaluation measures the extent of a
buying firm having a formal supplier evaluation system, which is
an important practice in supplier development (Krause et al.
1998). The construct of supplier performance captures multiple
supplier performance dimensions such as conformance, cost, on-
time delivery, and willingness to meet a buyer’s requirements
(Johnston et al. 2004). Last, we include both country and indus-
try dummies in the production function to control for the poten-
tial effects on supplier performance. Please see the Appendix for
detailed survey items.
Hypothesized factors in the inefficiency model
The measurements of hypothesized factors Z in the inefficiency
model in Equation (3) are also adapted from the existing supply
chain literature. The relational norms construct, adapted from
Min et al. (2007), assesses the extent of supplier relationship in
terms of supplier benevolence (Kumar et al. 1995; Min et al.
2007) and shared understanding between buyer and supplier. We
conceptualize the extent of information sharing as a firm’s will-
ingness to share all kinds of information. To reflect this concep-
tualization, we model both buyer’s and supplier’s information
sharing as reflective scales—high information sharing indicates
high extent of willingness to share all relevant information, as
opposed to formative scales—high information sharing can be
achieved by high extent of willingness to share selective
information. Specifically, the buyer information sharing construct
measures several types of information (e.g., production, delivery,
and scheduling) shared by buyers with their suppliers (Zhou and
Benton 2007). We asked the purchasing managers the informa-
tion they shared with their major suppliers. Similarly, the sup-
plier information sharing construct measures the information
shared by suppliers with their buyers. We asked the purchasing
managers whether they have access to the information from their
major suppliers. Rather than focusing on a firm’s willingness to
share information (Monczka et al. 1998), these two constructs
focus on the content of the information shared by suppliers and
buyers (Zhou and Benton 2007).
Finally, plant size may influence the efficiency of utilizing
supplier development practices. For example, a large plant may
have more personnel and capital to invest in supplier develop-
ment activities (Blonska et al. 2013). Therefore, plant size is
included as a control variable in the inefficiency function and
measured as the natural logarithm of the number of employees in
a plant (Dean and Snell 1991).
Country differences across measurement items
Since the survey data come from multiple countries, the respon-
dents across countries could interpret the measurement items dif-
ferently due to culture or language differences. To ensure
measurement invariance, we use the recently developed align-
ment method for multiple-group factor analysis (Asparouhov and
Muthen 2014), which is a procedure implemented in Mplus 7.1.
The alignment method is an optimization approach that identifies
an optimal pattern of measurement invariance solution and
detects groups that deviate from the optimal pattern. The align-
ment method is a two-step approach. In the first step, the align-
ment method fits a configural invariance model across groups
using maximum likelihood method with loadings and intercepts
freed, factor means fixed at zero, and factor variances fixed at
one. In the second step, the method estimates the factor means
and variances to minimize the total amount of measurement vari-
ances across all parameters by applying a simplicity function that
works as the rotation criteria for the exploratory factor analysis
(Asparouhov and Muthen 2014, 496–498). The estimation proce-
dure is an iterative approach with different starting values until
the procedure reaches an optimal and stable solution. Finally, the
alignment method reports the optimal solution (the best measure-
ment invariance pattern) and provides information to assess the
degree of noninvariance across groups. The results of the align-
ment method indicate that the number of groups with approxi-
mate measurement invariance in factor loading is high.
Asparouhov and Muthen (2014) suggest the number of measure-
ment noninvariance items should be lower than 20% of the total
items for the factor means to be comparable across groups. Our
result is well below the 20% cutoff (only one item shows sign of
measurement noninvariance; please see the Appendix for details).
As a result, we proceed with confirmatory factor analysis (CFA).
Psychometric properties of constructs
This research uses CFA to assess the psychometric properties of
the survey constructs. We drop the items with standardized factor
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loadings below the normally accepted level of 0.6 (Fornell and
Larcker 1981; Shah and Goldstein 2006). Most of the average vari-
ance extracted (AVE) values are greater than 0.5, which indicates
convergent validity (Hair et al. 2006), except supplier develop-
ment initiative (0.475). The AVE is slightly below 0.5 due to the
lower factor loading of one survey item (we offer the necessary
training to our suppliers). We decided to keep this item for a theo-
retical reason since this item represents an activity of supplier
development that requires buyers’ active participation. Composite
reliability (CR) coefficients ranged from 0.7 to 0.9, which exceed
the recommended 0.7 benchmark for construct reliability (Henseler
et al. 2009). The square root of the AVE for each hypothesized
factor is also greater than the correlations between the hypothe-
sized factors (Gefen and Straub 2005; Hair et al. 2006). The over-
all model fit statistics are all above the recommended standards
(root mean square error of approximation = 0.055 with PCLOSE
value = 0.167, comparative fit index = 0.946, Tucker Lewis
index = 0.938, standardized root mean square residual = 0.052)
(Hu and Bentler 1995, 1999). We also perform a bootstrapping
procedure with 1,000 samples to address potential multivariate non
normality. The model fit statistics are qualitatively similar. The
Appendix documents the measurement item loadings, CR, and
AVE of the constructs in this study.
We utilize the factor scores of each construct for subsequent
analysis rather than the averages following suggestions from past
research (Edwards and Wirth 2009). Factor scores are better than
averaging indicators because averaging requires stronger assump-
tions regarding psychometric properties (averaging requires the
indicators be parallel, whereas factor scores only require indica-
tors be congeneric), and factor scores often have more symmetri-
cal distributions (Edwards and Wirth 2009; Calantone et al.
2017). Factor scores are even more beneficial when researchers
have data from multiple countries and concerns about measure-
ment invariance (Flora et al. 2008).
RESULTS
We present the results with the half-normal distribution assump-
tion for the inefficiency term. We also analyze the data with the
exponential distribution assumption and the results are consistent.
Table 4 reports the estimation results regarding the production
function and inefficiency model using SFA. We use STATA 14
to perform the SFA (StataCorp 2015). The production function,
which estimates the efficient frontier, includes the two supplier
development practices (supplier development initiative and sup-
plier evaluation) as inputs and supplier performance as output.
We use the original factor scores for the production function
without any transformation instead of the commonly used Cobb–
Douglas production function since transforming the scores using
natural logs changes the underlying equal spacing assumption of
the Likert scales. Country and industry dummies are included in
the production function as control variables. The estimated coef-
ficients of the production function change only slightly across all
four models (Table 4), with different specifications of the ineffi-
ciency model. This indicates a stable efficient frontier. The coef-
ficients of supplier development initiative are significant across
all models, suggesting a valuable resource for supplier
performance. Conversely, supplier evaluation is not significant
across all models.
Model 0 represents the baseline case. For the inefficiency model,
Models 1–3 each includes one of the hypothesized factors; Model
4 includes all main effects, and Model 5 includes the interactions.
The model diagnostics statistics (Akaike information criterion
[AIC]/Bayesian information criterion [BIC]) show improvements
when comparing Models 1–3 each to Model 4 but not Model 5.
The primary focus of this study is the estimated coefficients in the
inefficiency model. As discussed before, a negative estimated coef-
ficient in the inefficiency model (Equation [3]) indicates a decrease
in the variance of firm-specific inefficiency ui, which denotes a
positive effect on supplier development efficiency. Plant size, a
control variable, is insignificant across all models. The estimated
coefficient of relational norms is negative in Model 1
(d = 2.284, p < .01), suggesting that relational norms has a pos-
itive effect on supplier development efficiency, but this effect is
not robust to the inclusion of the information sharing predictor
variables (Model 4, d = 0.022, n.s.), which provides only partial
support for H1. The coefficient of buyer information sharing is not
significant in Model 2 (d = 0.169, n.s.). Further, Model 4 shows
the coefficient is positive, indicating a negative effect on supplier
development efficiency (d = 2.767, p < .001). The results do not
support H2. The estimated coefficients of supplier information
sharing are negative and significant in both Model 3 (d = 1.487,
p < .01) and Model 4 (d = 3.688, p < .05), suggesting that sup-
plier information sharing has a positive effect on supplier develop-
ment efficiency, which provides support for H3. Finally, Model 5
shows the interaction effects between relational norms, buyer
information sharing, and supplier information sharing are not sig-
nificant. The results do not support H4a nor H4b. We discuss impli-
cations of the results further in Discussion and Conclusion section.
Robustness analysis
We present results using an alternative two-stage approach advo-
cated by certain researchers (Banker and Natarajan 2008) as a
robustness test. Researchers find that the coefficients remain sta-
tistically consistent even when the first-stage and second-stage
variables are correlated (Johnson and Kuosmanen 2012). In the
first stage, we estimate the efficiency score using SFA but
excluding the hypothesized factors in the inefficiency function.
In the second stage, we regress the logarithm of the efficiency
score on the hypothesized factors (see the results in Table 5).
The overall results are consistent with the main results using a
one-step approach.
Additionally, we use DEA as an alternative frontier approach
to examine the robustness of the study results (Banker et al.
1984). Prior studies often consider SFA and DEA as two com-
mon alternative frontier methodologies (Chen et al. 2015). We
consider input-oriented DEA because the focus is on better
resource utilization by changing the level or the mix of inputs.
Further, this study assumes variable return-to-scale since
increases in the extent of managerial practices do not necessarily
result in a proportional change in perceived supplier perfor-
mance. We apply a two-stage DEA estimation approach. In the
first stage, we obtain each plant’s supplier development effi-
ciency score using DEA with supplier development initiative and
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supplier evaluation, both adjusted by industry mean, as two
inputs, and supplier performance as the output. In the second
stage, we follow the bootstrap procedure described in Simar and
Wilson (2007), a widely used procedure in the field of eco-
nomics, to overcome the finite sample bias of the na€ıve two-
stage approach (regression analysis using the DEA efficiency
score as dependent variable). This procedure estimates standard
errors and confidence intervals by independently drawing
pseudo-errors from the truncated normal distribution using a
parametric bootstrap procedure (Simar and Wilson 2007).
STATA module simarwilson is used for estimation (Badunenko
and Tauchmann 2018). Table 6 shows the results of the Simar
and Wilson (2007) two-stage estimation approach. The overall
results are consistent with prior findings using SFA. Relational
norms (b = 0.256, p < .001) and supplier information sharing
(b = 0.298, p < .001) are positively associated with supplier
development efficiency; buyer information sharing has a negative
effect (b = 0.215, p < .001) (Table 6, Model 2), which are
consistent with the findings from the SFA method. In addition,




Existing empirical studies often focus on either identifying best
practices or on explaining variations in performance in terms of
best practices. Few studies focus on the efficiency of utilizing
Table 4: Estimates of the stochastic frontier analysis with half-normal distribution





1.162*** (0.100) 0.912*** (0.112) 1.151*** (0.109) 1.144*** (0.092) 1.159*** (0.111) 1.151*** (0.119)
Supplier
evaluation
0.185 (0.071) 0.111 (0.056) 0.176* (0.085) 0.223** (0.068) 0.235*** (0.063) 0.232 (0.064)
Industry
dummies
Included Included Included Included Included Included
Country
dummies
Included Included Included Included Included Included
Inefficiency model

















Plant size 0.193 (0.165) 0.073 (0.219) 0.081 (0.165) 0.191 (0.167) 0.178 (0.150)
Variance parameters
rv 0.256 0.268 0.259 0.251 0.238 0.238
v2 550.44*** 207.16*** 486.41*** 445.21*** 260.82*** 200.34***
Log-pseudo
likelihood
64.69 58.92 62.27 46.96 27.90 27.74
N 261 261 261 261 261 261
AIC 163.37 155.85 166.54 131.91 97.81 101.49
BIC 223.97 223.58 234.27 199.64 172.66 183.48
Notes: Dummy variables of country and industry are included in the production function.
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
We obtain comparable results using the exponential distribution of the inefficiency term.
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 (two-tail).
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best practices. We demonstrate that relational norms and supplier
information sharing can increase a buyer’s supplier development
efficiency, which prior studies have not yet considered. We also
provide a theoretical foundation indicating the reduction in
transaction costs is the underlying mechanism for changes in
supplier development efficiency.
The finding that information sharing by suppliers is more
influential as to supplier development efficiency than information
sharing by buyers merits further discussion. Though in theory,
information sharing could potentially reduce coordination costs
for efficiency gains, existing literature has mixed findings with
different attributions and thus calls for future investigations (Hult
et al. 2004; Carr and Kaynak 2007; Krause et al. 2007; Blonska
et al. 2013). Our study answers this call by separating informa-
tion sharing into sharing on both sides and finds that in practice,
supplier information sharing sends a stronger signal to the buyer
regarding the supplier’s commitment to the supplier development
program. Because supplier development represents a buyer’s
specific investment in a supplier, the reciprocity of a buyer’s
goodwill from the supplier is more meaningful than efforts origi-
nated by the buyer. Supplier information sharing, in this regard,
signals a supplier’s willingness to reciprocate a buyer’s invest-
ment, which further reduces the buyer’s transaction risk. In con-
trast, buyer information sharing may degrade supplier
development efficiency when the cost of sharing outweighs its
benefit in situations where suppliers experience information over-
load (Meier 1963). A supplier may also choose to neglect the
information provided by buyers to avoid information overload,
particularly when the information shared by buyers is self-contra-
dictory. Finally, we did not find consistent interaction effect
between relational norms and information sharing on efficiency
gains in both SFA and DEA models, which required further
research to investigate this issue.
Overall, by differentiating information shared by a supplier
versus a buyer, this research casts doubts on the conventional
wisdom that information sharing is always helpful (Dyer 1996;
Table 5: Results using two-stage estimation approach (robustness test)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Hypothesized factors
Relational norms (RN) 0.044** (0.018) 0.012 (0.017)
Buyer information sharing 0.012 (0.010) 0.116*** (0.015)
Supplier information sharing 0.064*** (0.010) 0.162*** (0.016)
RN 9 Buyer info sharing 0.068 (0.040)
RN 9 Supplier info sharing 0.063 (0.039
Control variables
Plant size 0.003 (0.005) 0.001 (0.006) 0.005 (0.005) 0.007 (0.005)
Industry dummies Included Included Included Included
F-statistics 3.09*** 0.63 20.34*** 18.64***
Within R2 0.024 0.005 0.141 0.314
Between R2 0.360 0.066 0.087 0.029
Overall R2 0.014 0.001 0.087 0.274
N 261 261 261 261
Notes: Dummy variables of industry are included as control variables. Fixed-effect regression with country as the cluster variable.
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Dependent variable: ln(Efficiency score from SFA).
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 (two-tail).
Table 6: Simar and Wilson (2007) two-stage estimation
approach with bootstrap standard errors
Model 1 Model 2
Hypothesized factors
















RN 9 Buyer info
sharing
0.095 (0.134)




Plant size 0.023 (0.014) 0.020 (0.013)
Industry dummies Included Included
Wald v2 86.06*** 102.33***
N 253 253
Notes: Dummy variables of industry are included.
Numbers in parentheses are bootstrap standard errors with 2,000 replica-
tions.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 (two-tail).
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Takeishi 2001). With much of the existing SD literature either
taking a buyer or supplier viewpoint, there is a call for dyadic
studies to better our understanding of SD (Krause 1999). This
study is one step closer to that call: By differentiating supplier
information sharing from buyer information sharing, we consider
both views in the same study and find that supplier information
sharing is more beneficial to supplier development efficiency
than information sharing on a buyer side. Besides, compared to
the existing empirical studies that based on samples from one
country or a region (e.g., studies by Wagner 2006, 2010, 2011),
our sample came from 11 countries across three continents,
improving the generalizability of the study findings.
Managerial implications
Practitioners can benefit from this study as well. The supplier
development initiative is subsumed under the broader supply
management program with an ultimate goal of improving a
buyer’s competitive advantages via improved supplier perfor-
mance. Due to limited human and financial capitals, buyers
often struggle with allocating internal resources to supplier
development in the hope of improving supplier performance.
The study results show that supplier development initiative is
a more valuable resource than supplier evaluation for supplier
performance. Therefore, we suggest that training and continu-
ous improvement activities with suppliers should be prioritized
for managerial attention and resource allocation than building
a supplier evaluation system. Another thing that purchasing
professionals should be aware of is that contrast to the com-
mon belief, buyer information is not a panacea for supplier
development efficiency. While buyer information sharing may
reduce the bullwhip effect in a supplier, buyers should not
expect that their sharing of information with the supplier will
increase in supplier development efficiency. Rather, buyer
information sharing may reduce supplier development effi-
ciency due to information overload experienced by the sup-
plier. In short, buyers should be aware of the potential
downside of sharing information. In contrast, supplier informa-
tion sharing can increase the efficiency of buyer-initiated sup-
plier development programs. Therefore, buyers should focus on
encouraging and designing incentives to motive suppliers to
share information with buyers.
The other implication practitioners can take away regards
building relational norms with suppliers and supplier information
sharing, the two key factors that each enhances supplier develop-
ment efficiency. Though there lacks a complementary effect
between these two, we can still draw inference about the dyna-
mism between them. First, managers should understand that rela-
tional norms acts as the lubricant to reduce the wastes (i.e.,
opportunism, needs of monitoring, or coordination) generated
from the transformation process that transforms supplier devel-
opment initiative and supplier evaluation system to supplier per-
formance. Specifically, increased trust and commitment lead to
reduced business partners’ desire for secrecy and seeking self-
interest in disguise, motivating information sharing (Modi and
Mabert 2007). Moreover, the effect of relational norms alone has
a greater magnitude in improving supplier development effi-
ciency than supplier information sharing. Taken together, the
results of this study suggest that to improve efficiency when fac-
ing limited resources, purchasing and supply chain managers
should first invest in building relational norms with their busi-
ness partners; once a high level of relational norms is estab-
lished, suppliers would naturally and more likely to discard their
guards and share information freely, enhancing efficiency even
further.
Overall, we suggest that relational norms and supplier infor-
mation sharing help explain why some buyers are more efficient
at utilizing their supplier development practices to develop their
suppliers than others. In sum, if supplier development practices
are the hardware for developing suppliers, relational norms and
supplier information sharing act as the software that increases the
hardware efficiency.
Limitations and future research
The HPM project is comprehensive and requires a significant
amount of commitment from both researchers and industry par-
ticipants; however, it is not without limitation. The participating
firms mainly were mainly recruited through team researchers’
personal networks. The measurement scales used in this study
are part of the larger HPM project. They were not specifically
designed for this study and therefore are confined to the exist-
ing survey items. In addition, the research team relied on firm
managers’ judgments to identify high-performing plants to be
included in the HPM project. As the data focus on high-per-
forming plants, the sample is not random. Nonetheless, includ-
ing only high-performing plants is particularly suitable for this
research since the purpose of SFA is to estimate an efficient
frontier, and the focus of this study is on proactive and strate-
gic-oriented supplier development, as opposed to reactive-
oriented supplier development. An efficient frontier constructed
by a group of high-performing plants is more representative
and informative than a frontier constructed by a group of ran-
domly selected plants. Another limitation is that the survey data
only come from the buyer side. The results that only supplier
information sharing has a significant effect may also reflect
dyadic differences in buyer–supplier collaborations. Future
research is encouraged to collect data from the supplier side to
verify the results of this study. Another interesting avenue of
future research is to compare our findings with findings from a
supplier-initiated context. For programs that are initiated by the
suppliers, we suspect that buyer information sharing could be
more influential because a supplier would expect reciprocity
from the buyer.
In summary, this study establishes a framework and identifies
factors for supplier development efficiency. Supplier develop-
ment consumes significant buyer resources, but the outcomes
often vary. We view supplier development from an efficiency
perspective and examine factors that help firms use resources
more efficiently to achieve better outcomes. Supplier develop-
ment literature is not short of studies regarding best practices and
their effects on performance. Nonetheless, very few studies
examine the follow-up question: how to increase the extent of
efficiency of using such practices. We hope this research stimu-
lates interest and encourages future researchers to examine man-
agerial practices from an efficiency perspective.
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APPENDIX: MEASUREMENT SCALES
Alignment method for factor loading with a total of 11 countries (groups)











We encourage our suppliers to continuously improve
their production processes.
29.47 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
We offer the necessary training to our suppliers. 21.83 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
We share our vision and supply chain policy with
our key suppliers.
28.68 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
As our suppliers strive to improve their processes,
we provide assistance.
36.43 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Supplier evaluation
We have a formal supplier certification program. 32.54 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Our company has a formal system for tracking the
performance of the suppliers that we deal with.
25.81 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Our plant has a formal system for evaluating and
rewarding suppliers.
29.19 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
We assess the performance of our suppliers through
formal evaluation, using established guidelines and
procedures.
25.74 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
We provide our suppliers with feedback about the
results of their evaluation.
31.63 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Supplier performance
Fast delivery 39.04 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
On-time delivery 27.47 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Product liability 29.98 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Reputation for corporate social responsibility 33.66 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Service level 31.29 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Technical skill 35.09 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Use of sustainability practices 29.15 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Willingness to adapt processes to meet your
changing needs
32.87 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Willingness to adapt products to meet your changing
needs
35.95 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Willingness to participate in your plant’s new
product development
48.78 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
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When we share our problems with our suppliers, we
know they will respond with understanding.
37.51 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
We can count on our suppliers to consider how their
decisions and actions will affect us.
22.23 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
We are able to anticipate our suppliers’ actions in
specific situations.
38.82 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Buyer information sharing (Our key suppliers have access to the following information about our plant)
Cost information 55.38 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Demand change information 30.36 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Demand forecast information 33.15 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (10) 11
Plant capability information 25.04 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Inventory information 26.70 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Production capacity information 30.61 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Schedule information 38.97 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Supplier information sharing (Our plant has access to the following information about our key suppliers)
Cost information 32.92 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Demand change information 27.69 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Demand forecast information 48.91 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Inventory information 25.83 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Production capacity information 32.58 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Productivity information 36.14 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Schedule information 24.31 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Psychometric properties
Table A3: Production function
Supplier development initiative
AVE = 0.475, CR = 0.728, alpha = 0.713
Factor loading
We encourage our suppliers to continuously improve their production processes. .658
We offer the necessary training to our suppliers. .616
We share our vision and supply chain policy with our key suppliers. .782
As our suppliers strive to improve their processes, we provide assistance.*
Supplier evaluation
AVE = 0.594, CR = 0.814, alpha = 0.844
We have a formal supplier certification program. .787
Our company has a formal system for tracking the performance of the suppliers that we deal with. .709
Our plant has a formal system for evaluating and rewarding suppliers.*
We assess the performance of our suppliers through formal evaluation, using established guidelines and procedures. .812
We provide our suppliers with feedback about the results of their evaluation.*
Supplier performance
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Use of sustainability practices .716
Willingness to adapt processes to meet your changing needs .734
Willingness to adapt products to meet your changing needs .697
Willingness to participate in your plant’s new product development *
*Excluded due to low factor loadings (<0.6).
Table A4: Hypothesized factors in the inefficiency model
Relational norms
AVE = 0.504, CR = 0.752, alpha = 0.755
Factor loading
When we share our problems with our suppliers, we know they will respond with understanding. .643
We can count on our suppliers to consider how their decisions and actions will affect us. .705
We are able to anticipate our suppliers’ actions in specific situations. .775
Buyer information sharing (Our key suppliers have access to the following information about our plant)
AVE = 0.512, CR = 0.840, alpha = 0.865
Cost information*
Demand change information .715
Demand forecast information .675
Plant capability information*
Inventory information .753
Production capacity information .695
Schedule information .737
Supplier information sharing (Our plant has access to the following information about our key suppliers)
AVE = 0.626, CR = 0.909, alpha = 0.914
Cost information .676
Demand change information .797
Demand forecast information .799
Inventory information .807
Production capacity information .823
Productivity information*
Schedule information .833
*Excluded due to low factor loadings (<0.6).
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